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Abstract
In this paper, we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with
an informal sector. Our model extends Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by allowing
for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal-sector productivity. We use
the model to analyse the eﬀects of labour market policy on informal-sector and formal-
sector output, on the division of the workforce into unemployment, informal-sector
employment and formal-sector employment, and on wages. Finally, we examine the
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11 Introduction
In this paper we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the eﬀects of
labour market policies in an economy with a signiﬁcant informal sector. What we mean by
an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly aﬀected by labour
market policies such as severance or payroll taxes. We ﬁnd that labour market policies that
apply only to the formal sector nonetheless aﬀect the size and the composition of employment
in the informal sector. This is important since there is substantial economic activity in the
informal sector in many economies, particularly in developing countries. Estimates for some
Latin American countries put the informal sector at more than 50% of the urban work
force.1 The informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some
developed economies.2
Although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a
segmented labour market framework, this interpretation is not consistent with recent empir-
ical evidence from Latin America. Under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation,
one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the sec-
ondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal-sector jobs. Maloney
(2004) presents evidence for several Latin American countries that challenges this view and
instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro-entrepreneurial sector. Sim-
ilarly, using data from the Argentinian household survey, Pratap and Quintin (2006) reject
the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater Buenos Aires area, concluding
that there is no evidence of a formal-sector wage premium after controlling for individual
and establishment characteristics. Evidence from Mexico (Gong and Van Soest, 2002; Gong,
Van Soest and Villagomez, 2004) and from Colombia (Mondragón and Peña, 2008) is also
consistent with Maloney’s (2004) perspective. These papers document a negative associa-
tion between informal-sector employment and education level within countries; there is also
a negative correlation between informality and average educational attainment across coun-
1According to Maloney (2004), the informal sector includes 30 to 70% of urban workers in Latin American
countries.
2Schneider and Enste (2000) give estimates for a wide range of countries. They calculate that the informal
sector accounts for 10 to 20% of GDP in most OECD countries, 20 to 30% in Southern European OECD
countries and in Central European transition economies. They calculate that the informal sector accounts for
20 to 40% of GDP for the former Soviet Union countries and as much as 70% for some developing countries
in Africa and Asia.
2tries (Mastalioglu and Rigolini, 2006). Finally, there are economies with relatively ﬂexible
labour markets that nonetheless have large informal sectors.3
The view of the informal sector that we take in this paper is that it is important, that
it can be usefully modeled as unregulated self employment, and that whether a worker is
employed in the formal or the informal sector is to some extent a matter of choice. An
important determinant of the worker’s choice is his or her relative productivity in the two
sectors, and a more highly skilled worker is more likely to be found in the formal sector. There
is, however, signiﬁcant mobility between the two sectors, so we need to take into account
that workers are not always in their preferred jobs. In taking this view of informality, we
speciﬁcally have Latin America in mind. Our model — at least not without substantial
modiﬁcation — would not apply to, for example, Africa. Our assumption that a worker
c h o o s e sh i so rh e rs e c t o ro fe m p l o y m e n td o e sn o tm e a nt h a tw o r k e r si nt h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o r
are as well oﬀ as those in the formal sector. As Maloney writes (2004, p.12), “to say that
workers are voluntarily informally employed does not imply that they are either happy or
well oﬀ. It only implies that they would not necessarily be better oﬀ in the other sector.”
The model that we present in this paper is a substantial extension of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), hereafter MP, a standard model for labour market policy analysis in a
search and matching framework.4 Their model is particularly attractive for our purposes
because it includes endogenous job separations. Speciﬁcally, we extend MP by (i) adding an
informal sector and (ii) allowing for continuous worker heterogeneity. The second extension
is what makes the ﬁrst one interesting. We allow workers to diﬀer in terms of what they
are capable of producing in the formal sector. All workers have the option to take up
informal-sector opportunities as these come along, and all workers are equally productive in
that sector, but some workers — those who are most productive in formal-sector employment
— reject informal-sector work in order to wait for a formal-sector job. Similarly, the least
productive workers do not ﬁnd proﬁtable work in the formal sector. Labour market policy,
in addition to its direct eﬀects on the formal sector, changes the composition of worker
types in the two sectors. A policy change can disqualify some workers from formal-sector
3Maloney (1999) presents interesting evidence for Mexico, where there is a large informal sector, even
though the usual sources of wage rigidity are absent. He notes that in Mexico minimum wages are not
binding, unions are more worried about employment preservation than about wage negotiations, and wages
have shown downward ﬂexibility.
4There is a substantial literature that analyzes the equilibrium eﬀects of labour market policies in devel-
oped economies using a search and matching framework, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (2003).
3employment; similarly, some workers accept informal-sector work who would not have done
so earlier. Labour market policy thus aﬀects the mix of worker types in the two sectors.
These compositional eﬀects, along with the associated distributional implications, are what
our heterogeneous-worker extension of MP buys.
We use our model to analyse the eﬀects of labour market policy in an economy with an
informal sector. We focus on the eﬀects of severance taxes and payroll taxes because these are
particularly important in Latin America.5 We do this by solving our model numerically and
performing policy experiments. We start from a baseline case that represents a composite
Latin American economy. We then carry out two sets of simulations. We ﬁrst vary the
payroll tax rate, holding the severance tax at its baseline level, and then reverse the exercise,
varying the severance tax while holding the payroll tax rate constant. Second, we vary the
two taxes simultaneously, holding tax revenues constant at the baseline level. We investigate
the eﬀects of these changes on aggregate labour-market outcomes and on formal-sector wage
inequality. We also display the steady-state distributions of productivity and wages across
formal-sector jobs.
Holding the payroll tax rate constant, we ﬁnd that the severance tax reduces the rate
at which workers ﬁnd formal-sector jobs but at the same time increases average employ-
ment duration in the formal sector. There are also compositional eﬀects — fewer workers
take formal-sector jobs and fewer workers reject informal-sector jobs. The net eﬀect is that
unemployment among workers who take formal-sector jobs falls, as does aggregate unem-
ployment. Holding the severance tax constant, a payroll tax has somewhat diﬀerent eﬀects.
It also reduces the rate at which workers ﬁnd formal-sector jobs, but, unlike the severance
tax, it decreases average employment duration in the formal sector. Again, there are com-
positional eﬀects. As with the severance tax, fewer workers reject the informal sector, and
more workers reject the formal sector. Unemployment among workers who take formal-sector
jobs increases, as does aggregate unemployment. Even though severance taxation decreases
unemployment while payroll taxation increases unemployment in our policy experiments,
severance taxation is the more distorting policy. A severance tax has strong negative eﬀects
on productivity because ﬁrms keep jobs intact even when productivity is low to avoid paying
the tax. On the other hand, payroll taxation has a positive eﬀect on formal-sector produc-
tivity. Only high-productivity matches are worth sustaining in the presence of a payroll tax.
5See Heckman and Pagés (2004). For the speciﬁc case of Colombia, see Kugler (1999) and Kugler and
Kugler (2008).
4Both policies lead to a fall in net output, but the severance tax has a much stronger eﬀect.
In fact, payroll taxation is welfare improving in our simulations in the sense that raising this
tax increases the sum of net output and tax revenues. There are two reasons for this. First,
increasing the payroll tax undoes some of the worst eﬀects of severance taxation; in particu-
lar, payroll taxation partially reverses the incentive that severance taxation gives to prolong
unproductive matches. Second, there is an ineﬃciency in the laissez faire equilibrium — the
incentive to turn down informal-sector opportunities in order to wait for a formal-sector job
is too strong for some workers. Taxation, especially payroll taxation, works to correct this
ineﬃciency. When we vary the two taxes simultaneously holding total tax revenue constant,
in particular, as we increase the severance tax and decrease the payroll tax rate holding
tax revenue at the baseline level, unemployment decreases, employment duration rises, and
formal-sector productivity falls. This is as expected since an increase in the severance tax
and a decrease in the payroll tax each move these variables in the same direction, holding
the other tax constant. To the extent that the two tax changes have opposing eﬀects, e.g.,
an increase in the severance tax moves workers from the formal to the informal sector while
a decrease in the payroll tax has the opposite eﬀect, the severance tax eﬀects dominate.
Finally, we look at the eﬀect of varying the two taxes simultaneously on formal-sector wage
inequality. An increase in the severance tax coupled with a decrease in the payroll tax
reduces wage dispersion in the formal sector.
There are several other recent papers that model the eﬀects of labour market policy in
economies with an informal sector. Many of these adopt the view that the informal sector is
illegal, with tax evasion and noncompliance with legislation as its identifying characteristics.
These papers focus on the disutility of participation in the underground economy and analyse
the eﬀect of monitoring and punishment on informality.6
Another approach is the one taken by Satchi and Temple (2006) and Zenou (2008).
Workers are assumed to be homogeneous, and a central issue in these papers is why identical
workers are paid a higher wage in the formal sector than in the informal sector. Both papers
assume that the informal sector is perfectly competitive but that there are matching frictions
6See, for example, Fugazza and Jacques (2004), Kolm and Larsen (2004), Boeri and Garibaldi (2007),
and Bosch (2007). Laing, et al. (2005) provides an interesting mirror image of this literature. They use a
search-matching model to analyse rural-urban inequality in China. Under the huku system, a fraction of the
workforce is prohibited from leaving the rural sector. These workers can and do, however, seek urban work
illegally.
5in the formal sector. There is no unemployment per se in these models; rather, workers in the
informal sector search for formal-sector jobs, i.e., queue for formal-sector jobs. Satchi and
Temple (2006) examine how growth aﬀects the sizes of and outcomes in the rural, informal
and formal sectors and calibrate their model to Mexican data, while Zenou (2008) focuses
on the eﬀects of policies such as unemployment compensation.
Amaral and Quintin (2006) is closer in spirit to our model in that workers in the informal
sector are not queuing for formal-sector jobs. In their model, there are two worker types,
unskilled and skilled. Managers choose between ﬁnancing their operations out of savings
versus borrowing. In order to borrow, a ﬁrm must operate in the formal sector, where
debt contracts can be enforced. Operating in the formal sector thus gives greater access to
capital; on the other hand, ﬁrms operating in the informal sector are not taxed. Assuming
that unskilled labour is a substitute for capital, while skilled labour is a complement, workers
with formal-sector jobs are paid higher wages and are more productive than workers in the
informal sector. Thus, the more productive workers sort themselves into the formal sector.
Relative to Amaral and Quintin (2006), our approach oﬀers two advantages. First, we allow
for matching frictions, so we can analyse the unemployment eﬀects of labour market policy.
Second, we allow for a continuum of worker types, as opposed to simply unskilled versus
skilled. Taken together, these two assumptions (matching frictions and a continuum of types)
lead to imperfect sorting. On average, workers in the formal sector are more productive than
their informal-sector counterparts. This allows us to give a rich distributional analysis of the
eﬀects of labour market policy.
Finally, although their model does not address informality per se, Dolado et al. (2007)
is also closely related to our work. They construct a search and matching model to analyse
the eﬀect of targeted severance taxes. They assume that vacancies can be ﬁlled with either
high-skill or low-skill workers. When a worker and a vacancy meet, an idiosyncratic match
productivity is realised, and the distribution of match productivity for high-skill workers
stochastically dominates the one for low-skill workers. Relative to Dolado et al. (2007), our
approach has the advantage of allowing for a continuous distribution of worker types as well,
of course, as being explicitly focused on informal-sector issues.7
In the next section, we describe our model and prove the existence of equilibrium. Section
7Our model is also related to the macro literature that introduces home (nonmarket) production into
growth models (Gollin et al., 2004; Parente et al., 2000) and RBC models (Benhabib et al., 1991) in the
sense that our informal sector could be reformulated as a home production sector.
63 is devoted to our policy experiments. Our simulations give a qualitative sense for the
properties of our model as well as a quantitative sense for the impact of the policies. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
Our model is an extension of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). As such, we work in contin-
uous time and assume that workers are risk neutral, inﬁnitely lived, and discount the future
at rate r. We model labour market frictions using a matching function and assume that
when an unemployed worker and a vacancy meet, they match if and only if the joint surplus
from the match exceeds the sum of the values they would get were they unmatched. This
joint surplus is then split via Nash bargaining. There is free entry of vacancies, so that in
equilibrium, the value of maintaining a vacancy equals zero. Match productivity is subject
to idiosyncratic shocks, and the rate of job destruction is endogenous.
We extend the MP model in two ways. First, we allow for an informal sector. We keep
our treatment of this sector as simple as possible. A worker in an informal-sector job receives
ﬂow income y0, which is the same for all workers. Opportunities to work in the informal
sector arrive to the unemployed at exogenous Poisson rate α, and employment in this sector
ends at exogenous Poisson rate δ. Finally, we assume that employment in the informal
sector precludes search for a formal-sector job; i.e., there are no direct transitions from the
informal to the formal sector (nor are there direct transitions in the opposite direction).
These simplifying assumptions can be relaxed, albeit at the cost of algebraic complication.
Second, we assume that workers diﬀer in their maximum productivities in formal-sector
jobs. In particular, we assume that worker type (maximum productivity) is distributed across
a unit measure of workers according to the continuous density f(y), 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Aw o r k e r
starts a formal-sector job at his or her maximum productivity, y, and match productivity
is then subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which change the current level of productivity on
that job to a new level, y￿.8 The surplus from a formal-sector match depends both on the
current productivity of the match and on the worker’s type and, as in MP, we assume the
wage is continuously renegotiated, including when the match productivity changes. Thus
8Alternatively, we could assume that initial match productivity is a draw from the shock distribution as
is done, for example, in Dolado et al. (2007). This is inessential — the key point of our speciﬁcation is that
aw o r k e ro ft y p ey can never produce more than y in a formal-sector match.
7the wage, w(y￿,y), also depends on both the current productivity and the worker’s type. Job
destruction is endogenous — a match ends when it is in the mutual interest of the worker and
ﬁrm to do so.
Since we are particularly interested in analysing the eﬀects of severance and payroll
taxes, we augment our model to include those policies. The introduction of a payroll tax is
straightforward, but the introduction of a severance tax requires us to distinguish between
the initial negotiation between a worker and a ﬁrm and subsequent negotiations. In the
initial negotiation, if bargaining breaks down, the ﬁrm does not have to pay a severance
tax, but in subsequent renegotiations, the ﬁrm’s outside option must include the severance
tax. This implies that with a severance tax, the initial wage negotiated between the ﬁrm
and a worker of type y, which we denote by w(y), diﬀers from subsequent wages negotiated
between the ﬁrm and that worker when the worker’s current productivity level y￿ = y, i.e.,
w(y,y).9
The details of the productivity shock process are as follows. Consider a worker of type
y in a formal-sector job. Shocks to the productivity of this worker’s match, which arrive
at exogenous Poisson rate λ,a r eiid draws from a continuous density
g(y￿)
G(y)
for 0 ≤ y￿ ≤ y.
The restriction on the range of y￿ (and the corresponding normalisation by G(y))r e ﬂ e c t s
our assumption that a worker’s current productivity can never exceed his or her type.10
When a shock occurs, there are two possibilities to consider. First, if the realised value
of the shock is suﬃciently low, the match breaks up. Here “suﬃciently low” is deﬁned in




, a shock ends worker y’s match. Second, if R(y) ≤ y￿ ≤ y,




match continues after a shock, but at the new productivity level and with the corresponding
renegotiated wage. An important twist in our model is that diﬀerent worker types have
diﬀerent reservation productivities; that is, instead of a single reservation productivity, R,
as in MP, there is an equilibrium reservation productivity schedule, R(y).
9See the discussion in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
10In an earlier version of the paper, we assumed that shocks were random draws from g(y￿) for 0 ≤ y￿ ≤ 1.
When the realized shock was such that y￿ >y ,we reset the productivity of the match to y. This speciﬁcation
gives qualitatively similar results.
82.1 Workers
The worker side of the model is a straightforward extension of MP. A worker can be in
one of four states: (i) unemployed, (ii) employed in the informal sector, (iii) employed as
a new hire (outsider) in the formal sector with wage w(y), or (iv) employed in the formal
sector as an insider with wage w(y￿,y). Unemployment is the residual state in the sense that
workers whose employment in either an informal-sector or a formal-sector job ends ﬂow back
into unemployment. Unemployed workers receive b, which is interpreted as the ﬂow income
equivalent to the value of leisure. As mentioned above, informal-sector opportunities arrive
at exogenous rate α and generate a ﬂow income of y0. Formal-sector opportunities arrive
at endogenous rate m(θ), where the matching (or meeting) function, m(θ), has standard
properties.11 It is important to note that not all workers are “qualiﬁed” for formal-sector
work. There is a threshold y∗ (to be determined in equilibrium) such that workers with
y<y ∗ do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to take formal-sector jobs. Similarly, there is a threshold
y∗∗ (also determined in equilibrium) such that workers with y>y ∗∗ never take informal-
sector opportunities. The opportunity cost of exiting unemployment, and thus temporarily
giving up the possibility of ﬁnding formal-sector work, is too high for these workers. Workers
are thus partitioned into three groups, (i) 0 ≤ y<y ∗, i.e., low-productivity workers who
never take formal-sector jobs, (ii) y∗ ≤ y ≤ y∗∗, i.e., medium-productivity workers who
accept any employment opportunity that comes along, whether it be informal or formal, and
(iii) y∗∗ <y≤ 1, i.e., high-productivity workers who never take informal-sector jobs.12
Let U(y) be the value of unemployment for a worker of type y, N0(y) be the value of
informal-sector employment for this type of worker, N1(y) be the initial value of employment
for a worker of type y, and N1(y ,y) be the value of employment for a worker of type y in
a match that has experienced one or more shocks and has current productivity y . The ﬂow







m(θ)/θ = ∞ and lim
θ→∞
m(θ)/θ =0 .
12We assume purely random search. That is, unemployed workers simply bump into informal-sector
opportunities and formal-sector vacancies every now and then. This means that workers of type y<y ∗
congest the formal-sector market. Alternatively, we could assume that these workers only look for informal-
sector opportunities and redeﬁne θ to only include workers seeking formal-sector employment. This would
not aﬀect our qualitative conclusions.
9value of unemployment for a worker for type y is13
rU (y)=b + αmax[N0(y) − U (y),0] + m(θ)max[N1(y) − U (y),0].
This worker receives a ﬂow utility of b while unemployed. At the rate α, the worker meets
an informal-sector opportunity and, if it is taken, realises a capital gain of N0(y) − U (y).
At the rate m(θ), the worker meets a formal-sector vacancy and, if the job is taken, realises
a capital gain of N1(y) − U (y). The ﬂow value of taking an informal-sector job is
rN0(y)=y0 + δ (U (y) − N0(y)),
while the ﬂow value of a formal-sector job depends on whether the worker is an outsider or
insider. These values are
rN1(y)=w(y)+λ
G(R(y))


















where the ﬁnal two terms in these expressions reﬂect our assumptions about the shock
process.
2.2 Firms
Next, consider the vacancy-creation problem faced by a formal-sector ﬁrm. The value func-
tions for a ﬁlled job must take into account severance and payroll taxes since we assume these
are nominally paid by employers. Let V be the value of creating a formal-sector vacancy,
J(y) be the initial value of ﬁlling a job with a worker of type y,a n dJ(y￿,y) be the value of
employing a worker of type y in a match with current productivity y￿. The latter two values
can be written as
13This Bellman equation, like all others in the paper, is the one anticipated to hold in steady state.
10rJ (y)=y − w(y)(1+τ)+λ
G(R(y))
G(y) (V − J (y) − s)+λ
y 
R(y)
















A ﬁrm that employs a worker of type y initially receives ﬂow output y and pays a wage of
w(y). After a shock that changes the match productivity to y￿, the ﬁrm receives ﬂow output
y￿ and pays a wage of w(y￿,y). Wages are taxed at rate τ.The ﬁnal two terms in these value
functions again reﬂect our assumptions about the shock process. At rate λ, a productivity
shock arrives. With probability
G(R(y))
G(y)
, the job ends, and the ﬁrm pays severance tax s
a n ds u ﬀ e r sac a p i t a ll o s so fe i t h e rV −J(y)−s or V −J (y￿,y)−s. If the realised shock x falls
in the interval [R(y),y], the value of the match changes to J(x,y). Note that for simplicity,
we assume that tax receipts are “thrown into the ocean,” i.e., used for purposes outside the
model.
The value of a vacancy is deﬁned by
rV = −c +
m(θ)
θ
E max[J(y) − V,0]. (1)
This expression reﬂects the assumption that match productivity initially equals the worker’s
type and that the initial bargain between the worker and ﬁrm does not include the severance
tax as a part of the ﬁrm’s outside option. The expectation in this expression is taken over
the distribution of y among the unemployed. A ﬁrm does not know in advance what type of
worker it will meet. It may, for example, meet a worker of type y<y ∗, in which case it is not
worth forming the match. If the worker is of type y ≥ y∗, the match forms, but the job’s value
depends, of course, on the worker’s type. Finally, note that in computing the expectation,
we need to account for contamination in the unemployment pool. That is, the distribution of
y among the unemployed, in general, diﬀers from the corresponding population distribution.
We deal with this complication below in the subsection on steady-state conditions.
As usual in this type of model, the fundamental equilibrium condition is the one given
by free entry of vacancies, i.e., V =0 . Equation (1), with V =0 , determines the equilibrium
value of labour market tightness. The other endogenous objects of the model, namely, the
11wage schedules, w(y) and w(y ,y), the reservation productivity schedule, R(y), and the cutoﬀ
values, y∗ and y∗∗ can all be expressed in terms of θ.
2.3 Wage determination and reservation productivities
Wages are determined using the Nash bargaining assumption with an exogenous worker






One can verify that
w(y)=
β (y − λs)+( 1− β)(1 + τ)rU(y)
1+τ
.
That is, the initial wage is a weighted sum of the worker’s type minus a term reﬂecting the
severance tax that must eventually be paid and the worker’s continuation value.




 ,y) − U(y)]
β [J(y
 ,y) − (−s)]
1−β .
This wage function can be written as
w(y
 ,y)=
β (y  + rs)+( 1− β)(1 + τ)rU(y)
1+τ
.
This insider wage is higher than the outsider wage for a current productivity of y because
the severance tax worsens the ﬁrm’s bargaining position.
Formal-sector matches are destroyed when a suﬃciently unfavorable productivity shock
is realised. The reservation productivity R(y) is deﬁned by the zero-surplus condition,
N1(R(y),y) − U(y)+J (R(y),y)=−s.




(r + λ)G(y)((1 + τ)rU (y) − rs) − λ
 y




12For any ﬁxed value of y,this is analogous to the reservation productivity in MP. This equation
m a k e si tc l e a rt h a ts shifts the R(y) schedule down, while τ shifts it up.
An interesting question is how the reservation productivity varies with y. On the one
hand, the higher is a worker’s maximum potential productivity, the better are his or her
outside options. That is, U(y) is increasing in y. This suggests that R(y) should be increasing
in its argument. On the other hand, a “good match gone bad” retains its upside potential.
The ﬁnal term in equation (2), which can be interpreted as a labour-hoarding eﬀect, is
decreasing in y. This suggests that R(y) should be decreasing in y. As will be seen below,
once we solve for U(y), which of these terms dominates depends on parameters.
2.4 Unemployment values and cutoﬀ productivities
In order to solve for the wages and reservation productivities, we need expressions for the
unemployment values and the cutoﬀ productivities. Recall that workers with y<y ∗ work
only in the informal sector, workers with y∗ ≤ y ≤ y∗∗ accept both informal-sector and
formal-sector jobs, and workers with y>y ∗∗ accept only formal-sector jobs. Thus y∗ is
deﬁned by the condition that a worker of type y∗ be indiﬀerent between unemployment
and a formal-sector oﬀer, and y∗∗ is deﬁned by the condition that a worker of type y∗∗ be
indiﬀerent between unemployment and an informal-sector oﬀer.
For a worker of type y ∈ [y∗,y ∗∗], the value of unemployment is given by
rU (y)=b + α[N0(y) − U (y)] + m(θ)[N1(y) − U (y)].
The condition that N1(y∗)=U (y∗) then implies
rU (y
∗)=b + α[N0(y






r + α + δ
.
Note that rU(y) takes this value for all y ≤ y∗ and that this value does not depend on θ.
A worker who is on the margin between accepting and rejecting formal-sector jobs does not













[1 − G(x)]dx. (3)
13Since R(y∗) does not depend on θ (because rU(y∗) does not depend on θ), neither does y∗.
To ﬁnd y∗∗ we set N0(y∗∗)=U (y∗∗), which implies that
rU (y
∗∗)=b + m(θ)[N1(y
∗∗) − U (y
∗∗)].
In addition, setting U (y∗∗)=N0(y∗∗) implies that rU (y∗∗)=y0, so substitution gives
N1(y
∗∗)=
(r + m(θ))y0 − rb
rm(θ)
.















Since U(y) is increasing in y for all y ≥ y∗ and since rU (y∗∗) >r U(y∗), it follows that
y∗∗ >y ∗ as we have assumed.
While rU(y) has a simple form that does not depend on y or on taxes when y ≤ y∗ and








(r + α + δ)(rG(y)+λ)+βG(y)(r + δ)m(θ)










λ +( r + βm(θ))G(y)
.
Note that the two expressions would be identical if the informal sector did not exist, that is,
were α = δ =0 .
Given the expression for R(y), equation (2), the diﬀering forms for rU(y) mean that the
form of R(y) diﬀers for medium- and high-productivity workers. For any ﬁxed value of θ,
equation (2) has a unique solution for R(y). One can also check, given a unique schedule
R(y), that equations (3) and (4) imply unique solutions for the cutoﬀ values, y∗ and y∗∗,
respectively.
142.5 Steady-state conditions
The model’s steady-state conditions allow us to solve for the unemployment rates for the
various worker types. Let u(y) be the fraction of time a worker of type y spends in un-
employment, let n0(y) be the fraction of time that this worker spends in informal-sector
employment, and let n1(y) be the fraction of time that this worker spends in formal-sector
employment. Of course, u(y)+n0(y)+n1(y)=1 .
Workers of type y<y ∗ ﬂow back and forth between unemployment and informal-sector
employment. There is thus only one steady-state condition for these workers, namely, that
ﬂows out of and into unemployment must be equal,
αu(y)=δ(1 − u(y)).







,n 1(y)=0 . (5)
There are two steady-state conditions for workers with y∗ ≤ y ≤ y∗∗, (i) the ﬂow out
of unemployment to the informal sector equals the reverse ﬂow and (ii) the ﬂow out of





(1 − u(y) − n0(y)).
Combining these conditions gives
u(y)=
δλG(R(y))
λ(δ + α)G(R(y)) + δm(θ)G(y)
n0(y)=
αλG(R(y))




λ(δ + α)G(R(y)) + δm(θ)G(y)
.
Finally, for workers with y>y ∗∗ there is again only one steady-state condition, namely,



























We use the free-entry condition to close the model and determine equilibrium labour market





To determine the expected value of meeting a worker, we need to account for the fact
that the density of types among unemployed workers is contaminated. Let fu(y) denote the



























Equation (8), of course, only makes sense if its right-hand side is positive. Since J(y∗)=0
and J(y) is increasing in y for y ≥ y∗, a necessary condition for equation (8) to have a
solution is y∗ < 1. From equation (3), a simple suﬃcient condition for y∗ < 1 is
(1 + τ)
b(r + δ)+αy0
r + α + δ
+ λs < 1. (9)
16If severance and/or payroll taxes are high enough, no formal-sector matches form. In that
case, equation (8) cannot hold, and the only equilibrium is one in which all employment is
in the informal sector. Such an equilibrium is not particularly interesting, so henceforth we
assume that inequality (9) is satisﬁed. That is, we consider equilibria with formal-sector
employment.
A steady-state equilibrium with formal-sector employment is a labour market tightness θ,
together with a reservation productivity function R(y), unemployment rates u(y), and cutoﬀ
values y∗ and y∗∗ such that
(i) the value of maintaining a vacancy is zero
(ii) matches are consummated and dissolved if and only if it is in the mutual
interest of the worker and ﬁrm to do so
(iii) the steady-state conditions hold.
Such an equilibrium exists if there is a θ that solves equation (8), taking into account
that R(y),u (y), and u are all uniquely determined by θ. A solution to equation (8) ex-
ists since the limit of its right-hand side is ∞ as θ → 0 and is 0 as θ →∞ . While it
is clear that a steady-state equilibrium with formal-sector employment exists, to establish
uniqueness requires showing that the right-hand side of equation (8) is monotonically de-
creasing in θ. Labour market tightness enters into the right-hand side of equation (8) in







through its eﬀect on the reservation productivity schedule.
Since R(y) is monotonically increasing in θ for all y>y ∗, the value of a ﬁlled job, J(y) is
monotonically decreasing in θ. Finally, θ enters u(y)/u both through u(y) and u. Intuitively,
it is clear that u(y) should be decreasing in θ for all y ≥ y∗. That is, the direct eﬀect of an
increase in the job-ﬁnding rate for a worker of type y should more than oﬀset any second-
order eﬀect via a change in R(y). The issue is that the overall unemployment rate, u, is
also decreasing in θ. Further assumptions on G(·) are required to establish that u(y)/u is
decreasing in θ for all y ≥ y∗.14
Given assumed functional forms for the distribution functions, F(y) and G(y￿), and for
the matching function, m(θ), and given assumed values for the exogenous parameters of
14In our simulations, when we assume that productivity shocks are iid draws from a uniform distribution,
the equilibria are always unique.
17the model, equation (8) can be solved numerically for θ. Given θ, we can then recover
the other equilibrium objects of the model. In fact, we can do more than this. Once we
solve for equilibrium, we can compute the steady-state distributions of productivity and
wages in formal-sector employment. We can then use these distributions to evaluate both
the aggregate and distributional eﬀects of labour market policy. Appendix A contains the
derivations of these distributions.
3S i m u l a t i o n s
In this section, we simulate the eﬀects of labour market policy. Speciﬁcally, we examine
the eﬀects of severance taxation and payroll taxation. We carry out two sets of numerical
experiments. First, starting from our baseline case, we examine the eﬀect of varying each
of the taxes, holding the other tax at its baseline level. Second, we vary the two taxes
simultaneously while holding total tax revenue constant. We examine the eﬀects of these
policies on aggregate outcomes, e.g., the unemployment rate, the size of the informal sector,
the average wage and level of productivity in formal-sector jobs, and on wage inequality.
3.1 Baseline case
We use the following functional forms and parameter values for our simulations. First, we
assume that the distribution of worker types is uniform over [0,1] and that the productivity
shock is likewise drawn from a standard uniform distribution. We assume the standard
uniform for computational convenience, but it is not appreciably more diﬃcult to solve
the model using a ﬂexible parametric distribution, e.g., the beta. Second, we choose our
parameter values with a year as the implicit unit of time. We set r =0 .04 as the discount
rate. We normalise the ﬂow income equivalent of leisure, b,t o0. We set the parameters for
the informal sector as y0 =0 .20,α=5and δ =0 .5 and for the formal sector as c =0 .2,
β =0 .5, and λ =0 .5. Third, we assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function, speciﬁcally,
m(θ)=4 θ
1/2. Note that the worker bargaining power parameter, β, equals the elasticity of
the matching function with respect to labour market tightness. Our parameter values were
chosen to produce plausible results for our baseline case in which there is a severance tax of
0.3 and a payroll tax rate of 0.5.
Our baseline economy is meant to approximate a composite of several of the larger Latin
18American economies, in particular, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Since our
model is designed to examine the eﬀects of labour market policy on the division of the work-
force among unemployment, informal-sector employment and formal-sector employment, a
primary target of our calibration is to produce reasonable ﬁgures for these categories. Oﬃcial
unemployment rates in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico typically fall in the 5-10%
range (lower for Mexico, higher for Colombia). Our baseline unemployment rate of 7.2% is
in this range and is also consistent with Gong, et al.’s (2004) estimate of a nonemployment
rate for Mexican males of 6.1% (based on Mexico’s Urban Employment Survey) and the
5.5% ﬁgure that Bosch (2007) uses in his calibration of the Brazilian labour market. At the
other extreme, Mondragón and Peña (2008) estimate an urban unemployment rate of 13%
for Colombia. In our baseline case, 38.3% of the work force is in informal-sector employment
and 54.5% in formal-sector employment. This is consistent with the ﬁgures used by Satchi
and Temple (2006) in their calibration of the Mexican economy as well as with Gong, et
al.’s (2004) estimates. Similarly, Pratap and Quintin (2006) estimate that about 30% of
total employment in Buenos Aires and its suburbs is informal, Mondragón and Peña (2008)
estimate a slightly lower fraction for Colombia, and Bosch (2007) uses 39% in his calibration
for Brazil. Some authors estimate considerably higher rates of informal-sector employment,
e.g., Maloney (1999) for Mexico and Kugler (1999) for Colombia, but their ﬁgures are based
on a ﬁrm-size deﬁnition of informality, whereas the lower ﬁgures that we try to match are
based primarily on questions that try to ascertain whether a worker’s employer is paying
taxes, making contributions to health care funds, etc.
There is also information about unemployment and employment duration for these coun-
tries. For example, Gong, et al. (2004) present annual transition matrices for Mexico for
ﬂows between nonemployment, informal-sector employment and formal-sector employment,
and Mondragón and Peña (2008) present similar ﬁgures for Colombia. In Mexico, 84% of
the workers who are in formal-sector employment in year t are also in the formal sector in
year t +1 ;in Colombia, the corresponding ﬁgure is 83%. Taken at face value, these ﬁgures
would suggest an average duration of formal-sector employment of more than 6 years, but, of
course, there are many workers who change status within each year and whose transitions are
not captured in these ﬁgures. On the other hand, using quarterly data, Gong and Van Soest
(2002) report that 89% of Mexican male workers employed in the formal sector in quarter t
are also employed in that sector in quarter t+1, suggesting an expected duration of formal-
sector employment of slightly more than two years. Given our parameterisation, we have a
19baseline employment duration of slightly less than 3.5 years, which falls between these two
ﬁgures. There are also some studies that estimate hazard rates using Latin American data.
For example, Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003) use data from Buenos Aires for the 1990’s, a
period of particularly high unemployment in Argentina. The mean survivor rates that they
present are consistent with short durations, both for employment and for unemployment.
Our baseline average unemployment duration of 2.69 months is roughly consistent with the
ﬁgures they present.
We are also interested in matching the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors,
but our model generates a larger gap than is reported in most studies. Since we treat work
in the informal sector as self employment, the informal-sector wage is simply y0 =0 .2.W e
generate an average formal-sector wage of 0.363, so our baseline has an informal/formal wage
ratio of 0.55. For Argentina, Pratap and Quintin (2006) report a ratio of about 0.77, while
Bosch (2007) uses a ratio of 0.81. The ﬁgures for Colombia and Mexico are similar. We could
change our baseline parameters to come closer on the informal/formal wage gap, but we have
chosen to focus our eﬀort on matching employment, unemployment, and the relative size of
the informal sector as discussed above.
Our baseline taxes are τ =0 .5 and s =0 .3, which generate a total tax revenue of 0.148
(equal to 37% of net output). In his calibration of the Brazilian labour market, Bosch (2007)
uses τ =0 .37 as his payroll tax rate baseline and sets ﬁring costs equal to 15 months of the
average wage (compared to our ﬁgure, which corresponds to about 10 months of the average
wage). For Colombia, Kugler and Kugler (forthcoming) indicate that the payroll tax is on
the order of 40 - 60%. Finally, Satchi and Temple (2006) assume a severance tax equal to 4
months of wages plus another 2 months for a pure ﬁring cost. In short, our baseline payroll
and severance tax ﬁgures are consistent with the levels of our composite Latin American
economy.
3.2 Numerical analysis
We now present our numerical analysis of the model and examine the eﬀects of varying the
severance tax and the payroll tax rate. Our policy experiments are based on comparing
steady states. We ignore transition path eﬀects, although we recognise that these are also
relevant for analysing the welfare eﬀects of a policy change.
Consider ﬁrst the baseline case given in row 3 of Tables 1a and 1b. With the severance
20tax of 0.3 and a payroll tax rate of 0.5, our baseline generates a labour market tightness of
θ =1 .24. Almost 40% of the labour force works only in the informal sector (y∗ =0 .390), while
about 53% of the labour force works only in the formal sector (y∗∗ =0 .468). The remaining
7% work in either sector as the opportunity to do so arises. The reservation productivity
for the worker who is just on the margin of working in the formal sector is about 0.23,w e l l
below y∗ =0 .39. Because the severance tax makes it is costly to end a match, jobs persist
for some range of adverse shocks. Next, note that R(y∗∗) is slightly greater than R(y∗). As
we discussed earlier, there are two eﬀects of y on the reservation productivity. First, more
productive workers have greater “upside potential”; on the other hand, more productive
workers have better outside options. For this parameterisation, the second eﬀect is slightly
stronger among workers between the two cutoﬀs, i.e., between y∗ and y∗∗, although for
other parameterisations, R(y) is slightly decreasing in this range. Among high-productivity
workers, i.e., workers with y ≥ y∗∗, however, R(y) is strongly increasing. This is shown in
Figure 1, which presents the reservation productivity schedule for the baseline case. The
next three columns of Table 1a give unemployment rates. The overall unemployment rate
for the baseline case is 7.2%. Among low-productivity workers, the unemployment rate is
δ/(α + δ)=9 .1% (not shown in the table since it is constant). The average unemployment
rate for medium-productivity workers is much lower, reﬂecting the fact that these workers
take both informal-sector and formal-sector jobs. Finally, the average unemployment rate
for high-productivity workers is 6.3%. This reﬂects the fact that these workers do not take
up informal-sector opportunities. The last two columns of Table 1a give the employment
rates for the baseline case. About 38% of the labour force is employed in the informal sector,
while about 55% is employed in the formal sector.
Table 1b gives average productivity for workers in the formal sector, which in the baseline
case is y  =0 .633, and the average wage paid to formal-sector workers, w =0 .363. The next
column of Table 1b gives net total output, i.e., the sum of outputs from the informal and
formal sectors net of vacancy creation costs (cθu), which is Y =0 .404 for the baseline case.
Tax revenue equals 0.148 in the baseline case. To the extent that tax revenues could be
redistributed in a lump-sum fashion or used to ﬁnance something of value (unmodeled), the
relevant output measure is net output plus tax revenues, i.e., 0.404+0.148 = 0.552. Finally,
we report expected durations for unemployment, vacancies, and employment in the formal
sector. The unemployment duration ﬁgure is for high-productivity workers, i.e., workers who
only accept formal-sector employment. These ﬁgures are given in months and are 2.69, 3.35,
21and 40.55, respectively.
We also show the distributions of formal-sector productivity and wages. Figure 2 presents
the distribution of types (y), and current productivities (y ) in the formal sector for the
baseline case. The density of y is the contaminated one; i.e., it incorporates the diﬀerent
job-ﬁnding and job-losing experiences of the various worker types. Since no worker’s cur-
rent productivity can exceed his or her type, the distribution of y necessarily ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates that of y . Both the severance tax and the payroll tax compress the
distribution of types in the formal sector. The severance tax shifts the density of current
productivity to the left, reﬂecting the decrease in reservation productivities. The payroll tax
shifts the density of y  to the right, reﬂecting the upward shift in the reservation productiv-
ity schedule. Thus, if tax revenue were held constant, increasing s and decreasing τ would
shift the density of y  to the left. Figure 3 presents the distributions of current productivity
and wages. Since the surplus is shared between the ﬁrm and the worker, the density of y 
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of w. In addition, as illustrated in Figure 3 for the
baseline case, both taxes compress the wage distribution.
The other rows of Tables 1a and b show the eﬀects of varying the severance tax, s, and
the payroll tax rate, τ. These tables allow us to present the eﬀects of each tax separately.
Tables 2a and b, which we discuss next, consider the eﬀects of varying the two taxes holding
tax revenue ﬁxed. To discuss the latter eﬀects, it is helpful to ﬁrst see how each tax operates
when the other tax is ﬁxed. Comparing rows 1, 3, and 5 of Tables 1a and b, we can see the
eﬀect of increasing the severance tax holding the rate of payroll taxation ﬁxed. An increase in
the severance tax makes vacancy creation less attractive, leads worker-ﬁrm pairs to sustain
relatively unproductive matches, and shifts employment from the formal to the informal
sector. On the other hand, an increase in s decreases overall unemployment. The increase
in expected employment duration among formal-sector workers outweighs the reduction in
the job arrival rate. Since the reduction in unemployment associated with formal-sector jobs
outweighs the eﬀect of the increase in the number of workers in the high-unemployment
informal sector, the overall unemployment rate falls. This fall in the overall unemployment
rate is more than oﬀset by the decrease in vacancy creation, so labour market tightness falls.
While the unemployment eﬀects of the severance tax make it seem attractive, this policy
leads to strong negative eﬀects on formal-sector productivity via the downward shift in R(y).
Wages in the formal sector fall, as does net output. Tax receipts ﬁrst increase in s but then
decrease. There are two reasons that tax receipts can fall as s increases — (i) there are fewer
22formal-sector matches to tax and (ii) worker-ﬁrm matches are increasingly less productive
on average, so payroll tax revenues fall. Finally, the increases in the durations of formal-
sector unemployment and employment are evident in Table 1b, and, not surprisingly, we see
a decrease in vacancy duration.
The eﬀects of varying the payroll tax rate holding the severance tax ﬁxed can be seen
in rows 2, 3, and 4 of Tables 1a and b. We consider payroll taxes ranging from zero to
100%. Increasing the payroll tax reduces θ by making formal-sector vacancy creation less
attractive. The payroll tax also has compositional eﬀects. The fraction of workers who never
take formal-sector jobs (y<y ∗) increases substantially with τ,and the fraction who only take
formal-sector jobs (y>y ∗∗) decreases substantially with τ. The payroll tax has a stronger
eﬀect on the unemployment value of high-productivity workers than on that of medium-
productivity workers, so y∗∗ increases by more than y∗ with τ. This means that the fraction
of workers who would take a job in either sector increases with τ. In contrast to the eﬀect
of the severance tax, a payroll tax decreases job duration by shifting up the reservation
productivity schedule. The fact that both labour market tightness and expected formal-
sector job duration decrease implies that unemployment increases among both medium- and
high-productivity workers. Consistent with the compositional change and the shift in the
reservation productivity schedule, average formal-sector productivity rises. Nonetheless, the
average formal-sector wage falls, as does net output. Tax receipts increase with τ at a
decreasing rate. There are fewer matches to tax as τ increases, but this eﬀect is oﬀset to
some extent by the fact that the matches that are taxed are increasingly more productive.
Interestingly, net output plus total tax revenue increases in the payroll tax rate. This
is partly a second-best result. The severance tax leads to ineﬃciently long employment
durations, and increasing τ works against this eﬀect. However, increasing the payroll tax
(at least over some range) would be beneﬁcial even were s =0 . There is an ineﬃciency
in the no-tax case that results from the interaction between worker heterogeneity and the
informal/formal dichotomy. The marginal workers (types y∗ and y∗∗) are making incorrect
decisions from a social planner’s perspective. We have made a strong assumption about
the matching process, namely, that increasing the size of the unemployment pool does not
make it more diﬃcult for an individual worker to ﬁnd an informal-sector opportunity. This
assumption — or, more generally, the assumption that congestion eﬀects are weaker in the
informal sector than in the formal sector — means that marginal workers are too eager
to wait for formal-sector jobs (equivalently, not eager enough to wait for informal-sector
23opportunities). That is, these workers fail to internalise the congestion externality that they
impose on other workers. In short, given our assumptions about the matching process, the
social planner would expand the size of the informal sector in order to reduce congestion in
the formal-sector market. This is precisely what taxes that are imposed only on formal-sector
matches do. Of course, in addition to this beneﬁcial eﬀect, taxation also has distortionary
eﬀects. The distortionary eﬀects of severance taxation are stronger than those of the payroll
tax, and this is why, for this parameterisation, an increase in τ increases welfare but an
increase in s does not.
Tables 2a and 2b show the eﬀect of changing the severance tax, s, and the payroll tax
rate, τ,holding tax revenue ﬁxed at the baseline level of 0.148. Reading down the table, we
raise s and adjust τ accordingly. Both taxes make vacancy creation less attractive, but the
severance tax has the dominant eﬀect for our parameterisation. Labour market tightness, θ,
decreases as s rises and τ falls. The two cutoﬀ values y∗ and y∗∗ increase with both s and
τ, but with tax revenue constant, the eﬀect of raising s dominates that of lowering τ, and
both cutoﬀ values rise as we go down Table 2a. That is, the fraction of workers who never
take formal-sector jobs (y<y ∗) increases, and the fraction who only take formal-sector jobs
(y>y ∗∗) decreases as s rises and τ falls. Because the severance tax makes it more costly
to end matches, increases in s shift the reservation productivity schedule down. However,
a payroll tax increase, ceteris paribus, would shift the reservation productivity schedule up.
Thus, as s increases and τ decreases, the two eﬀects reinforce each other and R(y∗) and R(y∗∗)
decrease substantially. There is also some decrease in the unemployment rates for medium-
and high-productivity workers. This again reﬂects the fact that the eﬀect of increasing job
duration outweighs the reduction in the job arrival rate. The overall unemployment rate falls.
Since an increase in s and a decrease in τ both reduce formal-sector productivity, y  falls.
Formal sector wages fall, as does net output. The changes in unemployment duration are
also consistent with the severance tax having a stronger eﬀect that the payroll tax. Finally,
since increases in the two taxes have opposite eﬀects on employment duration, when the
severance tax rises and the payroll tax rate falls, there is a large increase in employment
duration. Once the severance tax goes above s =0 .3, tax revenues fall holding τ ﬁxed at its
baseline level. That is, keeping tax revenues constant while raising the severance tax above
its baseline level requires an increase in the payroll tax rate. Since the severance tax eﬀects
are dominant, the unemployment rate continues to fall as s increases, but all other measures
of labour market performance continue to deteriorate.
24Table 3 presents several measures of wage inequality for the formal sector using the same
tax rates as in Tables 2a and 2b, i.e., holding tax revenue constant. We ignore inequality
in the informal sector because we have assumed a ﬁxed informal wage. While the ﬁgures in
Table 3 are thus not directly comparable to reported data, they do give an idea of the eﬀect
that varying the taxes has on wage inequality. For our baseline parameterisation, we ﬁnd
a 90/10 ratio of about 2.0 for the formal sector. Comparing the 90/50 ratio (1.35)t ot h e
50/10 ratio (1.50) indicates that there is more inequality in the bottom of the formal-sector
wage distribution. As we move down Table 3, the severance tax increases. This reduces
wage inequality substantially. A reduction in inequality is evidenced in both the top and
the bottom of the wage distribution, although there is a larger drop in the 50/10 ratio than
in the 90/50 ratio. The eﬀect on overall wage inequality is conﬁrmed in the last column of
Table 3, which reports the standard deviation of log wages.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we build a search and matching model to analyse the eﬀect of labour market
policies in an economy with a signiﬁcant informal sector. In light of the empirical evidence
for many developing countries, especially in Latin American, we model an economy where
workers operate as self employed in the informal sector. Our model is a substantial extension
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) that allows for imperfect sorting of workers between the
formal and informal sectors. Depending on their productivity levels, some workers only work
in the formal sector, others only work in the informal sector, and an intermediate group of
w o r k e r st a k ej o b si ne i t h e rs e c t o r .
We solve our model numerically and analyse the eﬀects of two labour market policies,
a severance tax and a payroll tax. A severance tax greatly increases average employment
duration in the formal sector, reduces overall unemployment, reduces the number of formal-
sector workers, and reduces the number of workers who accept any type of oﬀer (formal
or informal). A payroll tax reduces average employment duration in the formal sector,
greatly reduces the number of formal-sector workers, and signiﬁcantly increases the size of the
informal sector and the number of workers accepting any type of oﬀer. Total unemployment
rises. The two policies also have diﬀerent eﬀects on the distributions of productivity and
wages in the formal sector. The severance tax decreases average productivity, while the
payroll tax increases it, but under both policies, net output falls.
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285 Appendix A: Derivation of the equilibrium produc-
tivity and wage distributions for the formal sector
We start with the derivation of the joint distribution of (y￿,y) across workers employed in the
formal sector. Once we compute this joint distribution (and the corresponding marginals),
we can ﬁnd the distribution of wages in the formal sector.




Here h(y￿,y) is the joint density of current productivity and worker type, h(y￿|y) is the
conditional density of current productivity given worker type, and h(y) is the marginal
d e n s i t yo fw o r k e rt y p ea c r o s sw o r k e r se m p l o y e di nt h ef o r m a ls e c t o r .I ti sr e l a t i v e l ye a s yt o








where from equations (5) to (7),











for y ≥ y
∗∗.
Next, we need to ﬁnd h(y |y). C o n s i d e raw o r k e ro ft y p ey who is employed in the formal
sector. The worker’s match starts at productivity y; later, a shock (or shocks) may change
the match productivity. Let N denote the number of shocks this worker has experienced to
date (in the current spell of employment in the formal sector). Since we are considering a
worker who is employed in the formal sector, we know that none of these shocks has resulted
in a productivity realisation below R(y).
If N =0 , then y  = y with probability 1. If N =1 ,2,..., then y  is a draw from
g(y )
G(y) − G(R(y))
for R(y) ≤ y  ≤ y. Summarising, we have
P[y







(1 − P[N =0 ] )for R(y) ≤ y
  <y .
29We thus need to ﬁnd P[N =0 ]for a worker of type y who is currently employed in the
formal sector.
To do this, we ﬁrst condition on elapsed duration. Consider a worker of type y whose
elapsed duration of employment in her current formal sector job is t. Let Nt be the number
of shocks this worker has realised to date. Shocks arrive at rate λ. However, as the worker is
still employed, we know that none of the realisations of these shocks was below R(y). Thus,
Nt is Poisson with parameter λ(1 −
G(R(y)
G(y)




To ﬁnd P[N =0 ] , we integrate P[Nt =0 ]against the density of elapsed durations. A








. The exponential has the convenient property that the distributions of completed
















for a worker of type y.
Thus, the probability that a worker of type y is working to her potential when she is
employed in a formal sector job (i.e., that y  = y)i s
P[y




The density of y  across all other values that are consistent with continued formal-sector











for R(y) ≤ y
  <y .
The conditional distribution of y  given y thus consists of a smooth density for R(y) ≤ y  <y
coupled with a mass point at y  = y.
Given the marginal density for y and the conditional density, h(y |y), we thus have the
joint density, h(y ,y), w h i c hi sd e ﬁ n e df o rf o ry∗ ≤ y ≤ 1 and R(y) ≤ y  ≤ y, i.e., for the
(y ,y) combinations that are consistent with formal-sector employment. The ﬁnal steps are to
compute the densities of productivity in formal-sector employment (i.e., the marginal density





30To derive the distribution of wages across formal-sector employment, we use m(w)=

m(w|y)h(y)dy. We thus need the conditional distribution of wages given worker type, i.e.,
m(w|y). Recall that
w(y)=




β (y  + rs)+( 1− β)(1 + τ)rU(y)
1+τ
.
Worker y receives wage w(y) up to the time that the ﬁrst shock to match productivity is
realised. After that, the worker’s wage is given by w(y ,y). The probability that worker y
receives w(y) is thus P[N =0 ]=
G(R(y))
G(y)












)w − rs− (1 − β)(1 + τ)rU(y))
G(y)
for w ∈ [w(R(y),y),w(y,y)].
Summarising, conditional on y we have










)w − rs− (1 − β)(1 + τ)rU(y))
G(y)
for w ∈ [w(R(y)),w(y,y)).
Again, the conditional distribution of wages given worker type y is a continuous density over
[w(R(y)),w(y,y)) coupled with a mass point at w(y). Unless s =0 , this mass point will be
located below w(y,y).15
The ﬁnal step is to integrate the distribution of wages conditional on worker type against
the density of y among workers in formal-sector jobs. Note that although the distributions
of current productivity and wages given y both have mass points, these mass points are
smoothed away when we integrate against h(y).
15In our simulations, when we assume that productivity shocks are iid draws from a standard uniform
distribution, these expressions simplify considerably. Speciﬁcally, P[y￿ = y|y]=R(y)/y and h(y￿|y)=1 /y






for w ∈ [w(R(y)),w(y,y)).
31Table 1a: Eﬀects of Varying s and τ
Taxes u rates by type employment
s τ θ y∗ y∗∗ R(y∗) R(y∗∗) med high total n0 n1
0.1 0.5 1.59 0.317 0.398 0.263 0.280 0.041 0.069 0.074 0.321 0.605
0.3 0 1.40 0.288 0.336 0.126 0.129 0.029 0.058 0.066 0.276 0.658
0.3 0.5 1.24 0.390 0.468 0.228 0.234 0.036 0.063 0.072 0.383 0.545
0.3 1.0 1.08 0.486 0.599 0.324 0.333 0.041 0.069 0.076 0.488 0.436
0.5 0.5 0.97 0.444 0.522 0.175 0.170 0.030 0.055 0.069 0.428 0.503
Table 1b: Eﬀects on Durations of Varying s and τ without keeping tax revenue constant
Taxes formal sector output Tax
s τ y￿ w net Y Revenue
0.1 0.5 0.651 0.384 0.434 0.139
0.3 0 0.568 0.495 0.411 0.056
0.3 0.5 0.633 0.363 0.404 0.148
0.3 1.0 0.691 0.297 0.383 0.169
0.5 0.5 0.581 0.343 0.364 0.143







32Table 2a: Eﬀects of Varying s and τ with tax revenue constant at 0.148
Taxes ur a t e sb yt y p e employment
s τ θ y∗ y∗∗ R(y∗) R(y∗∗) med high total n0 n1
0 0.66 1.76 0.300 0.394 0.300 0.327 0.044 0.072 0.075 0.314 0.611
0.1 0.57 1.57 0.330 0.416 0.276 0.294 0.041 0.070 0.074 0.335 0.590
0.2 0.52 1.40 0.359 0.440 0.251 0.263 0.039 0.066 0.073 0.358 0.569
0.3 0.50 1.24 0.390 0.468 0.228 0.234 0.036 0.063 0.072 0.383 0.545
0.4 0.51 1.10 0.421 0.500 0.205 0.206 0.034 0.060 0.071 0.409 0.520
0.5 0.58 0.94 0.461 0.545 0.192 0.187 0.032 0.056 0.070 0.446 0.484
Table 2b: Eﬀects on Durations of Varying s and τ with tax revenue constant at 0.148
Taxes formal output
s τ y  w net Y
0 0.66 0.659 0.367 0.439
0.1 0.57 0.657 0.372 0.432
0.2 0.52 0.649 0.371 0.420
0.3 0.50 0.633 0.363 0.404
0.4 0.51 0.614 0.353 0.386
0.5 0.58 0.594 0.331 0.363








Table 3: Inequality Measures for the Formal Sector:
Tax revenue constant at 0.148
Taxes formal sector
s τ p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10
0 0.66 2.481 1.431 1.733
0.1 0.57 2.365 1.409 1.678
0.2 0.52 2.213 1.381 1.603
0.3 0.50 2.025 1.346 1.504
0.4 0.51 1.818 1.302 1.397



























































Densities of y' and w(y',y)
36